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Abstract
We analyze the effect of a large group on an impure public goods
model with lotteries. We show that as populations get large, and with
selfish preferences, the level of contributions converges to the one given
by voluntary contributions. With altruistic preferences (of the warm glow
type), the contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given
by voluntary contributions, even though in general they do not yield first-
best levels.
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1 Introduction
Most public goods in modern economies are provided by the government and
funded from revenues obtained via general taxes. But coercitive taxation has its
limits, for reasons that have to do both with the inefficient (or second-best) way
in which it is collected, and for political economy reasons. Yet, some legitimate
needs are not covered by the ordinary revenues from the state, and both private
and public entities resort to other mechanisms to fund those public goods. As
it is well known (e.g. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986)), providing them
via voluntary contributions usually leads to inefficient outcomes, so it is not
surprising that human ingenuity has devised other means to achieve the goal of
providing public goods efficiently.
One such method is a lottery in which a prize is given to the winner(s),
but a fraction of the proceeds goes to the provision of public goods. For a
while, there was a theoretical controversy about the usefulness of lotteries to
improve efficiency (see e.g. Borg, Mason, and Shapiro (1991)) or equity (see
e.g. Clotfelter and Cook (1989)) in public goods provision. This was essentially
settled when Morgan (2000) showed that lotteries can be used effectively to
solve the problem. He proved that lotteries significantly increase the level of
contributions above the one given by voluntary contributions. He also showed
that for large enough prizes, the lottery could make the provision of the public
good reach first-best levels.
The aim of this note is to establish the limits to the usefulness of lotteries in
the provision of public goods. We show that as populations get large, and with
standard preferences (for which an individual only cares about his own material
well-being), the level of contributions converges to the (inefficient) one given by
voluntary contributions. A more positive result arises when one considers people
with altruistic preferences as in the warm glow of giving model of Andreoni
(1989, 1990). In large populations, when people have these preferences the
contributions converge to a level strictly higher than those given by voluntary
contributions (still under warm glow preferences), even though in general they
do not yield first-best levels.
Our results clarify why it is so important that lottery proceeds are earmarked
to worthy causes, where warm glow is likely to be larger. In this way we
shed light on a controversy about the meaningfulness of earmarking (see e.g.
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Buchanan (1963) and Borg and Mason (1988)) because of the fungible nature of
government revenues. They also explain why in general governments do not rely
on lotteries for a large part of the revenue creation for public good provision.
Section 2 describes the reference benchmark model from Morgan (2000) and
also introduces warm glow preferences into such model. Section 3 presents the
results for large populations. Section 4 briefly concludes.
2 The Reference Model
We first recapitulate the results of Morgan (2000). He shows that his results for
the provision of public goods by means of lotteries also apply in the more gen-
eral case analyzed by Bergstrom and Cornes (1983), who provide a specification
of preferences in which income effects are present and public goods allocation
decision is separate from distributional decisions. They argue that this is essen-
tially equivalent to assuming that individual preferences can be represented as
a quasi-concave utility function of the form1,
UFBi = ωiH(G) + hi(G),
where H(·) > 0.
For the first-best benchmark, the optimal public good provision, which we
denote by G∗ solves
max
G∈R+
n∑
i=1
(ωiH(G) + hi(G)) . (1)
The individual preferences when the public good is provided by voluntary
contributions are:
UV Ci = (ωi − xi)H(G) + hi(G). (2)
Let x̂ ≡ ∑ni=1 xi and since contributions pay for the public good G = x̂. The
provision of public good by voluntary contributions, denoted by GV is the equi-
librium of the game in which each agent maximizes UV Ci with respect to his
contribution xi noting that G = x̂.
1Bergstrom and Cornes (1983) also provide a recipe for constructing quasi-concave func-
tions of this form and a diagnostic test to determine whether a given function of this form is
quasi-concave.
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Finally, in the lottery model of Morgan (2000), the utility function of agent
i takes into account that xi/x̂ represents the probability that individual i wins
the prize. Since the sum of all wagers must pay for the prize R, the public good
provision, denoted by GL, is determined by the excess of wagers over the prize,
that is:
GL = x̂−R
In this case the utility of agent i is:
ULi =
(
ωi − xi +Rxi
x̂
)
H(x̂−R) + hi(x̂−R).
In this case the provision of public good using the lottery scheme, GL, is the
equilibrium of the game in which each agent maximizes ULi . For simplicity of
exposition we will assume that for all games Γ we will describe in what follows
Assumption 1 UΓi satisfies:
1. It is twice continuously differentiable and concave in the decision variable
xi
2.
∂UΓi
∂xi
∣∣∣
xi=0,xj=ωj
> 0,
∂UΓi
∂xi
∣∣∣
xi=ωi
< 0
Using 1. in assumption 1 we can characterize equilibria using first order
conditions, and using 2. we guarantee solutions are interior. We can now show
that:
Proposition 2 GV , G∗ and GL satisfy:
1. GV < G∗.
2. GV < GL.
3. GL → G∗ as R→∞.
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.1 Incorporating the warm glow of giving in the reference
model
We now incorporate the warm glow approach of Andreoni (1989, 1990) into the
reference model by assuming that individual preferences can be represented as
follows,
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Uwgi = (ωi − xi)H(G) + hi(G)g(xi), (3)
where the function g(·) represents the warm glow of giving. Setting
g(xi) = g1xi + g0
the particular case where g1 = 0 and g0 = 1 corresponds to (2), the model used
by Morgan (2000) to show the robustness of his results.
The provision of public good by voluntary contributions when preferences
are as in (3), denoted by Gwg, is the equilibrium of the game in which each
agent maximizes Uwgi . For this game we can show that:
Proposition 3 GV < Gwg
Proof. See the appendix.
In Temimi (2001) the author shows that the introduction of warm-glow af-
fects both the equilibrium level as well as the efficient level of public good
provision. The condition determining the efficient level of provision for public
good case requires as usual that the sum of the marginal rates of substitution
(between the public good and the net private good) is equal to one. In our case
this is true when,
n∑
i=1
∂Uwgi
∂G
∂Uwgi
∂(ωi−xi) −
∂Uwgi
∂xi
= 1
Applied to the model in (3), the efficient level of public good provision under
warm-glow, Gwg∗, is given by the solution to:
n∑
i=1
(ωi − xi)H ′(Gwg∗) + g(xi)h′i(Gwg∗)
H(Gwg∗)− hi(Gwg∗)g1 = 1 (4)
2.2 Lottery in the warm-glow model and the efficient level
of contributions
Now we incorporate the lottery mechanism of Morgan (2000) into the above
model of warm glow. Individual i now chooses xi to maximize
UwgLi =
(
ωi − xi +Rxi
x̂
)
H(x̂−R) + hi(x̂−R)g(xi) (5)
As before, wagers pay for the prize R, so the public good provision, denoted by
GwgL, is:
GwgL = x̂−R
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Proposition 4 1. Gwg < GwgL.
2. When hi(·) = h(·), GwgL → Gwg∗ as R→∞ ⇐⇒ g1 = 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
3 The case of large populations
One result in Morgan (2000) shows that wagers in the unique equilibrium pro-
vide levels of public good close to first-best as the lottery prize increases. How-
ever, we have shown that this does not hold when g1 6= 0 (i.e. with warm glow)
for the impure public good case, at least when agents are homogenous. And
even when g1 = 0, if we allow the prize to reach arbitrarily large sizes, the prize
R will eventually be greater than nω, the maximum aggregate bid for given n
and ω. However, R is only useful if chosen so that in an interior symmetric
equilibrium the level of provision nx−R is positive (where x is the contribution
for each person). That is, a lottery prize yielding social benefits in terms of the
public good must have R = nρ with x > ρ.
In what follows we analyze the effect of increasing the prize in proportion to
the group size with homogeneous agents.
3.1 The linear case with identical agents
In order to illustrate the main point, let us first see what happens when the
utility function of agent i is as in (3) and H(·) and h(·) are increasing and linear
functions.
Proposition 5 Suppose R = nρ and H(·) and h(·) are increasing and linear
functions with H−hg1 > 0. Then for any symmetric equilibrium where the indi-
vidual contribution x satisfiess ρ < x, we have that lim supn÷∞
∣∣Gwg∗ −GwgL∣∣ /n >
0.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.2 A more general model
Now, let us consider a general case in which H(·) and h(·) are general increasing,
differentiable and strictly concave functions. That is, H ′(·) > 0, h′(·) > 0 and
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H ′′(·) < 0, h′′(·) < 0. With H ′(·) − h′(·)g1 > 0. The function g(·) remains a
linear function. Now we have:
Proposition 6 ∂G
wg
∂n > 0.
Proof. See the appendix.
Remark 7 From the proof of Proposition 6 one can see that under quasi-linear
preferences with H (·) ≡ 1 and in the absence of warm glow (as in one of
the benchmark models of Morgan (2000)) the provision of the public group is
invariant with respect to n.
If we introduce lotteries in the proposed model, we obtain that:
UwgLi =
(
ωi − xi +Rxi
x̂
)
H(x̂−R) + h(x̂−R)g(xi)
Proposition 8 Suppose R = nρ and ρ < x for any symmetric equilibrium with
individual contribution x. Then if H(·) and h(·) are such that
limy→∞H (y) /h (y) = k, and 1 > kg1 in a symmetric equilibrium
lim
n→∞x =
ρ
1− kg1
Proof. See the appendix.
As a result, if k = 0 or g1 = 0 then x approaches the corner solution x = ρ.
4 Conclusions
In this note we have shown that lotteries have limits as a tool to achieve efficient
public good provision in large populations. But we also show that lotteries are
clearly more effective than voluntary contributions when individuals experience
a warm glow of giving to public goods. One concrete empirical implication from
our analysis is that goods likely to produce a warm glow are more likely financed
in this way. This could be useful to analyze empirically the extent to which the
effects characterized in this paper are present in the field.
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5 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. This proposition is already shown in Morgan (2000), we merely add it
here for completeness.
G∗ solves
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
∗) = H(G∗)−H ′(G∗)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −G∗
)
. (6)
and we also obtain GV by adding first-order conditions of optimization problems
for each agent i,
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
V ) = nH(GV )−H ′(GV )
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −GV
)
. (7)
It is then easy to verify that GV < G∗. Also GL, solves the sum of first-order
conditions.
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
L) = H(GL)
(
n− (n− 1) R
R+GL
)
−H ′(GL)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −GL
)
(8)
Comparing expressions (7) and (8), Morgan (2000) shows that GV < GL, and
that as R→∞, expression (8) becomes identical to (6).
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. At an interior maximum, the first-order condition of (3) with respect
to x,
−H(G) + (ωi − xi)H ′(G) + h′i(G)(g1xi + g0) + hi(G)g1 = 0 (9)
The equilibrium level of public good provided by voluntary contributions with
the presence of warm glow giving, solves the sum of first-order conditions,
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wg)(g1xi + g0) +
n∑
i=1
hi(G
wg)g1 = nH(G
wg)
− H ′(Gwg)(
n∑
i=1
ωi −Gwg)
Then, we have
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wg)g0 = nH(G
wg)−H ′(Gwg)(
n∑
i=1
ωi −Gwg) (10)
−
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wg)g1xi −
n∑
i=1
hi(G
wg)g1
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Without loss of generality, set g0 = 1 and compare expressions (7) and (10) to
verify that the result holds.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Take the first-order conditions of (5) with respect to xi to find(
R
x̂− xi
x̂2
− 1
)
H(x̂−R) +
(
ωi − xi +Rxi
x̂
)
H ′(x̂−R) +
h′i(x̂−R)(g1xi + g0) + hi(x̂−R)g1 = 0
The public goods provision GwgL solves the sum of the first-order conditions,
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wgL)(g1xi + g0) +
n∑
i=1
hi(G
wgL)g1 = H(G
wgL)
(
n− (n− 1) R
R+GwgL
)
−H ′(GwgL)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −GwgL
)
We have
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wgL)g0 = H(G
wgL)
(
n− (n− 1) R
R+GwgL
)
−H ′(GwgL)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −GwgL
)
(11)
−
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wgL)g1xi −
n∑
i=1
hi(G
wgL)g1
Notice that expressions (10) and (11) differ by the term associated to the
negative externality of the lottery multiplied by H(G). Similar to the model
without warm-glow, the public goods provision under the lottery is greater than
under voluntary contributions. That is, Gwg < GwgL.
When R→∞, we obtain the expression
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wgL)g0 = H(G
wgL)−H ′(GwgL)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −GwgL
)
(12)
−
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wgL)g1xi −
n∑
i=1
hi(G
wgL)g1
From (4), we have that,
n∑
i=1
h′i(G
wg∗)
H(Gwg∗)− hi(Gwg∗)g1 g0 = 1−H
′(Gwg∗)
n∑
i=1
ωi − xi
H(Gwg∗)− hi(Gwg∗)g1(13)
− g1
n∑
i=1
xih
′
i(G
wg∗)
H(Gwg∗)− hi(Gwg∗)g1
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When hi(·) = h(·) and g1 6= 0, expressions (12) and (13) respectively reduce to:
nh′(GwgL)g0 = H(GwgL)−H ′(GwgL)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −GwgL
)
− g1h′(GwgL)GwgL − ng1h(GwgL)
nh′(Gwg∗)g0 = H(Gwg∗)−H ′(Gwg∗)
(
n∑
i=1
ωi −Gwg∗
)
− g1h′(Gwg∗)Gwg∗ − g1h(Gwg∗)
It is easy to verify that GwgL does not converge to Gwg∗ as R→∞. However,
as we have already seen when g1 = 0, the result is identical to Morgan (2000)
in which GL → G∗ as R→∞.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. Solving (13) to obtain the optimal level of provision, we have
Gwg∗ = n
Hω + hg0
2(H − hg1)
The first-order condition of (5) with respect to x assuming symmetry and R =
nρ is,(
nρ
n− 1
n2x
− 1
)
Hn(x−ρ) +
(
ω − x+ nρ 1
n
)
H +hg1x+hg0 +hn(x−ρ)g1 = 0
Hence,(
nρ
n− 1
n2x
− 1
)
Hn(x− ρ) + (ω − x+ ρ)H + hg1x+ hg0 + hn(x− ρ)g1 = 0
ρ
n− 1
x
H(x− ρ)−Hn(x− ρ) + (ω − x+ ρ)H + hg1x+ hg0 + hn(x− ρ)g1 = 0
dividing by n and letting n→∞
ρH(x− ρ) 1
x
−H(x− ρ) + h(x− ρ)g1 = 0
(x− ρ)
(
ρH
1
x
−H + hg1
)
= 0
This equation has two solutions, one is x1 = ρ. But since we require that
x− ρ > 0, it is not a valid one. The other solution solves
ρH
1
x
−H + hg1 = 0
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Then
x2 =
H
H − hg1 ρ
where x2 > 0 since H − hg1 > 0. This is an interior solution since x2 > ρ. In
this case, the level of public good is:
GwgL = nx2 −R = nx2 − nρ = n hg1
H − hg1 ρ.
As a result, we can verify that
Gwg∗ −GwgL(x2)
n
=
Hω + hg0
2(H − hg1) −
hg1
H − hg1 ρ
Now
lim sup
n→∞
Gwg∗ −GwgL(x2)
n
=
Hω + hg0
2(H − hg1) −
hg1
H − hg1 ρ
Hence in the case where
Hω + hg0
2(H − hg1) −
hg1
H − hg1 ρ 6= 0
the result follows. If
Hω + hg0
2(H − hg1) −
hg1
H − hg1 ρ = 0
then the inequality
x2 − ω = H
H − hg1
Hω + hg0
2hg1
− ω
= ω
(H − hg1)2 + (hg1)2
(H − hg1) 2hg1 +
Hhg1
(H − hg1) 2hg1 > 0
which contradicts x < ω and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. As we have shown in section 2.1, the first order condition of (3) is
−H(G) + (ωi − xi)H ′(G) + h′i(G)(g1xi + g0) + hi(G)g1 = 0
For the symmetric case,
−H(G) + (ω − x)H ′(G) + h′(G)(g1x+ g0) + h(G)g1 = 0
Comparative statics
−H ′(G)∂G
∂n
+ (ω − x)H ′′(G)∂G
∂n
− ∂x
∂n
H ′(G) +
h′′(G)
∂G
∂n
(g1x+ g0) + h
′(G)g1
∂x
∂n
+ h′(G)
∂G
∂n
g1 = 0
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Then
∂G
∂n
[(ω−x)H ′′(G)+h′′(G)(g1x+g0)−H ′(G)+h′(G)g1] = ∂x
∂n
[H ′(G)−h′(G)g1]
We have that
(ω − x)H ′′(G) + h′′(G)(g1x+ g0)−H ′(G) + h′(G)g1 < 0
and
H ′(G)− h′(G)g1 > 0
then
sign
∂G
∂n
6= sign∂x
∂n
Since ∂G
wg
∂n =
∂(nx)
∂n = x+ n
∂x
∂n . Then,
∂x
∂n < 0 and
∂Gwg
∂n > 0.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. The first-order condition,(
R
x̂− xi
x̂2
− 1
)
H(x̂−R) +
(
ωi − xi +Rxi
x̂
)
H ′(x̂−R) +
h′i(x̂−R)(g1xi + g0) + hi(x̂−R)g1 = 0
where x̂ =
∑
xi and by symmetry and assuming that R = nρ, we have(
nρ
n− 1
n2x
− 1
)
H(nx− nρ) +
(
ω − x+ nρ 1
n
)
H ′(nx− nρ) +
h′(nx− nρ)(g1x+ g0) + h(nx− nρ)g1 = 0
This is equivalent to(
ρ
n− 1
nx
− 1
)
H(nx− nρ) + (ω − x+ ρ)H ′(nx− nρ) + (14)
h′(nx− nρ)(g1x+ g0) + h(nx− nρ)g1 = 0
Returning to (14) and letting H ′ and h′ tend to 0 as n→∞, we obtain
ρH(nx− nρ) 1
x
−H(nx− nρ) + h(nx− nρ)g1 = 0
That is,
ρH(nx− nρ)− x[H(nx− nρ)− h(nx− nρ)g1] = 0
x =
ρH(nx− nρ)
H(nx− nρ)− h(nx− nρ)g1
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Since H ′ − h′g1 > 0 then H − hg1 > 0. Rewriting,
x =
ρ
1− h(nx−nρ)H(nx−nρ)g1
If we assume that h(nx−nρ)H(nx−nρ) → k as n→∞ with k > 0, then the unique interior
equilibrium can be written as,
x =
ρ
1− kg1
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